Tdd sample" to "population." Bayesian programs, like Carnap's, need no special principles (either substantive or methodological) for solving inverse inference.' After an initial (prior) probability is fixed for some hypothesis (and bayesian programs differ on whether the logic stipulates this prior), then confirmational conditionalization determines the subsequent (posterior) probability for that hypothesis, assuming new evidence is accepted. Moreover, this machinery works whether the hypothesis is general, as in inverse inference, or particular, as in predictive inference.
In opposition to bayesian theory, frequentists usually object to the principle of confirmational conditionalization not because its formal basis (Bayes' theorem) is less than valid, but because the presupposition of a precise, prior credal probability for a hypothesis (given an arbitrary knowledge base) is thought to be indefen~ible.~ * I wish to thank Henry Kyburg for his unbounded patience with me so that I might better understand his position. He has helped me correct several misunderstandings I had about epistemological probability. Isaac Levi has read earlier drafts of this paper and has suggested important revisions, which I have acted on. Also, I thank Carl Posy for his assistance in clarifying some obscure passages.
1 Throughout this paper I will call an inductive logic bayesian when (i) an agent's beliefs, a t a time, are represented by a single coherent probability function, (ii) an agent's confirmational commitments, a t a time, to changes in belief that follow a growth in knowledge are governed by Bayes' theorem (this is called confirmational conditionalization), and (iii) total evidence is respected.
I call an inductive logic frequentist when it seeks to by-pass confirmational conditionalization in inverse inference and, instead, relies upon (what Ian Hacking calls) a "frequency principle." That is, as described in the text, frequentists solve inverse inference by reduction to direct inference, and problems of direct inference (the "single case") are solved with a frequency principle.
The name 'frequentist' is not to suggest a frequency interpretation of probability. I t is a separate question whether or not some nonconfirmational probability 0022:362~/78/75 12/0709$02.20 0 1978 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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Especially in problems of inverse inference, where the hypothesis is general and the initial knowledge base is often weak, frequentists typically reject the bayesian assumption that there exists a precise prior probability for the hypothesis. Hence, frequentists are wont to deny a bayesian solution to inverse inference because confirmational conditionalization assumes too much. Whereas there is discord between the two schools on matters of inverse inference, there is relative harmony about simple cases of direct inference : inference from population to sample. For example, given merely the information that an urn contains equal numbers of red and black chips and that a chip is to be drawn by some suitable (random) process, there is unanimity that the probability is .5 that the chip to be drawn is black. This agreement is significant because, if one characteristic of a frequentist is opposition to bayesian conditionalization in inverse inference, a second is support for the constructive strategy of solving inverse inference problems by reducing them to cases of direct i n f e r e n~e .~ In this paper I attempt a refutation of frequentism by arguing that the program for reducing inverse to direct inference is not viable. Moreover, I claim my arguments also show that varieties of bayesian theory which try to resuscitate Laplacean Insufficient Reason (so that precise "ignorance" prior probability might be identified) fail in the same way the frequentist idea does.4 In section I I consider Henry Kyburg's original frequentist theory, efiistemological probability, and argue against its solution to inverse inference. (I am forced to treat his position separately because of the unusual stand that Kyburg takes in rejecting conditionalization.) In section 11 I consider Ian Hacking's novel reconstruction of Fisher's fiducial probability and argue that the inconsistencies present are representative of the generic weakness in the frequentist solution to inverse inference. I limit the discussion to problems of statistical inference, i.e., where populations and samples are of interest for their statistical properties only. Besides having practical significance, problems of statistical inference highlight the philosophical issues a t stake here.
is even recognized by a frequentist. For example, both Hacking's fiducial inference and Kyburg's epistemological probability are frequentist positions; yet Hacking acknowledges chances but Kyburg rejects any such notion.
For example, advocates of Neyman's confidence intervals, or Fisher's fiducial probability, or Fraser's structural inference, or Kyburg's epistemological probability, all subscribe to this policy. In this paper I will not address confidenceinterval theory. I believe adequate criticism of this program is already common in the literature.
' I have in mind particularly Sir Harold Jeffreys' inductive logic, especially his theory of insariants. A recent defense of Jeffreys' position is found in Roger Rosenkrantz, Inference, Method and Decision (Boston: Reidel, 1977) .
I
Within the last year readers of this JOURNAL have witnessed aspects of an ongoing debate between Isaac Levi and Henry Kyburg over fundamental issues in statistical inference. In "Direct Inferen~e,"~ Levi reports to us an incompatibility he uncovers between Kyburg's original theory, epistemological probability, and a conjunction of familiar inductive principles :principles all of which Levi finds compelling. (Levi attacks with a counterexample focused a t Kyburg's analysis of direct inference; hence his title.) Kyburg, who has developed epistemological probability over a twenty-year span, is not caught napping. In his recent book, T h e Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference, he devotes a chapter (chapter 11) to an evaluation of one of the inductive principles essential to Levi's counter argument, namely, confirmational conditionalization. On the basis of several numerical examples worked out in epistemological probability theory, Kyburg concludes that coilditionalization is worse than suspect.
In "Randomness and the Right Reference Class,""<yburg reiterates his rejection of conditionalization while challenging Levi to defend his own version of direct inference, a version obeying the controversial principle. Kyburg charges that, whereas all violations of conditionalization imposed by epistemological probability are either banal or otherwise intuitively satisfying (Levi's counterexample being of the first kind), it is Levi's position that is inadequate despite its adherence to conditionalization. Specifically, Kyburg sees Levi's program as overburdened with a bevy of unwarranted empirical assumptions, all needed to ensure conditionalization in even the simplest cases of direct inference. Thus, a central theme in their debate is the clash of arguments for and against the principle of conditionalization.
I t is not my intent in this article to critically re~riew Kyburg's evaluation of Levi's approach to direct inference.' I do, however, strongly disagree with Kyburg on his assessment of the status of epistemological probability theory. Specifically, I find serious difficulties in the epistemological-probability solution to inverseinference problems. Kyburg's theory is unusual in part in that all probability statements have the direct form. Since, as we expect of a frequentist inductive logic, epistemological probability solves inverse inference by reduction to direct inference, it: is only natural to wonder whether the violation of conditionalization (identified by Levi) affects inverse inference too. In what follows in this section I shall demonstrate that the sufficiency principle (a logical consequence of conditionalization) is violated, with the result that many basic inverse-inference problems are left unsolved. Also, once we understand the severity of Kyburg's rejection of conditionalization, we can identify three garden-variety statistical inferences (each related to inverse inference) that cannot be reproduced in epistemological probability theory. My concern with Kyburg's theory grows from a respect for and an appreciation of what we can learn from him about the limits of the frequentist program. Where epistemological theory encounters difficulties in inverse inference there is good reason to worry whether other frequentist approaches commit subtle, but serious errors in their haste to solve these problems. (We shall return to answer this question in section 11.)
T o understand better the controversy surrounding conditionalization, let us review the role played by this principle within a familiar logic of induction, to wit :a Carnapian framework. One of the secure principles in the Kyburg/Levi debate, i.e., one accepted with only minor revisions, is coherence. In a Carnapian system, coherence postulates the existence of a single probability function QK( ), defined over sentences or propositions, which represents an agent's degree of belief; where K (a consistent, deductively closed set of sentences) corresponds to his corpus of knowledge. Now, conditionalization fixes the commitments (the agent bears), arising from the epistemic state represented by QK( ), to other epistemic states that result merely by enlarging K through acceptance of new evidence.
That is, conditionalization identifies QK( /d) as the extension of the credal state QK( ), when K is augmented by datum d (and all its consequences). The multiplication axiom then yields the important result that, if Q K (~) # 0 and h is an hypothesis,
Calling K' the new corpus of knowledge that follows upon accepting evidence d [and assuming, as always, that Q K (~) # 01, we have the familiar bayesian formulation of conditionalization :
Returning to Kyburg's theory, we see that reformulation of these principles is no simple matter. Epistemological probability, unlike the Carnapian alternative, is not a real-valued but an interzlalvalued function. EPg(h) = [PI,,pn]. The epistemological probability of h, given knowledge base K , 8 is the interval [ p~, Pn] , 0 6 p~ < pu 5 1. Thus, Kyburg accommodates the usual frequentist objection to conditionalization by generalizing the representation of a rational belief state to include intervals of probability. His plausible idea is that, in cases where the knowledge base is empirically too impoverished to support precise probability values, intervals of probabilities are adequate.
The analogue to coherence in Kyburg's theory is his result that, for any finite set of sentences, there is some coherent probability function QK( ) that agrees with all the epistemological probability intervals E P K ( ) over the set.Y That is, there is a t least one Q K ( ) whose values fall within the corresponding intervals E P K ( ) for sentences in the set. But the difficulty in reformulating conditionalization is that the very simple try:
( h ) will not work, since the product and division of intervals is not meaningful.
In "On Indeterminate Probabilities,"l0 Levi develops an inductive logic that both uses (convex) sets of coherent probability functions to represent degrees of belief and satisfies a natural extension of conditionalization. However, Levi's important criticism of epistemological theory (in "Direct Inference") does not presume this generalization of conditionalization ; for, quite cleverly, Levi chooses a counterexample in which all epistemological probabilities are precise, point-valued ([p, p] ), even with changes in evidence. Were Kyburg's objections to conditionalization limited to the familiar frequentist plea: that conditionalization is to be restricted to problems where well-defined, i.e., precise, probability exists, then he would be obligated to satisfy conditionalization in Levi's example. Il'hat we learn from Levi's argument is that Kyburg's reservations on conditionalization are more estensive than is usual for a frequentist.ll See MT-12.1 of his Logical Fozindutions of Statistical Inference (Boston: Reidel, 1974) .
lo This JOURNAL, LXXI, 13 (July 18, 1974) : 391-418. Although Levi's prograin utilizes both confirmational conditionalization and a frequency principle, it is not bayesian (as that title is used here) since beliefs are not represented by a unique probability function, nor is it frequentist since Levi does not try t o solve inverse inference by reduction t o direct inference. Hence, his position is a n interesting alternative t o those discussed in the text. But an elementary calculation shows that no coherent probability function can satisfy these sis equations if conditionalization holds, even though all probabilities are precise.
As I reported a t the beginning of this section, Kyburg reacts to Levi's charge by claiming that whenever conditionalization fails in epistemological theory it is either because the failure is banali.e., What do we lose in Levi's example?12-or else the failure is satisfactory, as when we ignore conditionalization because, true to frequentism, our knowledge cannot be accurately represented by a precise, coherent probability function-i.e., conditionalization does not apply. I maintain that Kyburg is wrong and that we can clearly recognize the severity of the loss of conditionalization in terms of the collapse of his program for inverse inference.
Let me begin, then, with a brief rehearsal of Kyburg's ingenious scheme for reducing inverse to direct inference. Epistemological probability statements all have a direct-probability form : the E P K is [pL, fin] that entity a bears property F, since a is known to be an R and it is known only that between 9~ and pu of all Rs are Fs. Most of the important philosophical issues in inductive inference are treated through Kyburg's regulations governing randomness. Randomness conditions fix the reference class R and frequencies PL, PU of the epistemological probability statement.
That is, EPK(Fu) = [PL,PO], because randomness conditions yield the claim: a is a random member of the (reference) set of Rs, with respect to property F, and by appeal to the known frequency bounds [ p~, pu] for Fs among Rs. Thus, epistemological randomness solves the vexing problem of direct inference: how to choose the reference set. The trade-off that must be evaluated pits size of the reference set (the narrower the better) against width of the frequency bounds (the narrower the better), for with decreasing reference-set size comes (usually) a broadening of the frequency interval. For example, in the extreme case of a unit reference set { a ) , the frequency of Fs may be known to be bounded only by the trivial interval [0, 11.
The trick in converting inverse to direct inference rests on the use of a special property, called rational rep~esentativeness. For instance, suppose the inverse inference is from an observed sample of n flips with a newly bent coin to hypotheses about the bias of the coin. We assume, initially, no nontrivial frequency information about the bias of the coin, but we agree that the flips are (1) statistically independent, and (2) modeled by a binomiaI distribution with the binomial parameter 9 equal to the bias for landing heads up. Then 1%In "Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems," Journal of Philosophical Logic,VII, 2 (April 1978): 157-180, Kyburg argues against using betting arguments to show the penalties to be imposed on violators of coherence and conditionalization, a sample of n flips is rationally representative at the .1 lei 1 (RR.1) just in case the difference between the observed frequency of heads and the bias for heads is not more than .l. If the coin is flipped 100 times and 67 trials land heads up, the sample is RR.1 if and only if 18 -.67 1 5 .l. If the coin is "fair" (8 = .5) then the sample is not RR.1.
Although the R R property is not observable (since we are ignorant about the bias of the coin), it is very useful for inference about the bias, since (using a normal distribution approximation for the binomial frequencies) between 95% and 100% of all samples of 100-fold independent trials from a binomial process are RR.1. Furthermore, because we are relatively ignorant about the bias of this coin, upon learning that 67 of the 100 flips landed heads up, randomness conditions yield the claim that our observed sample is a random member of the (reference) set of all such 100-fold trials, with respect to the RR.1 property and subject to the known frequency bounds C.95, 11. Hence, EP=(RR.l (our sample)) = C.95, 11. In words, the epistemological probability equals the interval C.95, I] that 1 B -.67 1 5 .I, or, equivalently, the epistemological probability is no less than .95 that .57 5 8 5 .77. This last statement is a nontrivial solution to the inverse-inference problem, obtained by reduction to direct inference through the R R predicate.13
Obviously, the critical steps in this argument involve the randomness conditions; in particular, why is it that ours is a random sample with respect to the R R property and frequencies bounded by .95 and 1.0? The answer lies in the character of the randomness regulations which support claims of irrelevance unless relevance can be demonstrated. For example, if we concede that the next flip of a fair coin is random with respect to landing heads up and (precise) frequency .5, then unless we know enough about flips of fair coins that stay in the air for more than two seconds to defeat the randomness claim just made, the next flip will be a random member of the set of flips with fair coins that stay up for more than two seconds, with respect to landing heads up and (precise) frequency .5. That is, Kyburg's randomness conditions treat evidence as irrelevant unless relevance is demonstrable.
Before observing the sample of 100 flips, a simple direct inference leads to the conclusion that it is random with respect to RR.1 and frequencies bounded by .95 and 1.0. shown relevant to the initial randomness claim (which cannot happen if we are ignorant about 8), the sample is labeled random as in the argument above.14 I t is this attitude toward relevance that permits Levi's counterexample. But, as we see next, this treatment of relevance also leads to a rejection of the sufficiency principle (a consequence of conditionalization) with dire consequences for Kyburg's solution to inverse inference.
A question of both practical and theoretical importance for problems of inverse inference is how to recognize summaries of large bodies of data that preserve all the relevant information contained in the evidence as a whole. A powerful and widely accepted answer is given by the sufficiency principle.15
DeJinition: With respect t o inverse inference about a n unknown 8, a simplification (condensation) of data d t o t, a function of d alone, i.e.,
where HOis a hypothesis (of inverse inference) about 8. T h a t is, t is sufficient for d whenever the conditional probability of d, given t, is independent of the unknown 8.
S u f l c i e n c y principle:
If and only if t is sufficient for d, with respect to 8, then inference from t (alone) preserves all the relevant evidence contained in d concerning e.
For instance, in the problem discussed above, the epistemologicalprobability solution to inverse inference about the bias of a newly bent coin depends on knowing the frequency of flips landing heads up and the total number of trials. Kyburg's reduction to direct inference using RR rests upon the irrelevance (subject to randomness) of other aspects of the total evidence, such as the order of trials landing heads up among those landing tails up, the outcome of the first trial, the proportion of heads to tails among the odd-numbered flips, etc. Now it is not difficult to show that, for the binomial distribution with statistically independent trials, a sufficient set of statistics for sample data (with respect to inference about the binomial parameter) is the pair: number of trials and frequency of outcome.16 Thus, Kyburg's ingenious use of the property of being rationally 14 I thank Professor Levi for suggesting this distinction to me and for pointing out its significance in separating Kyburg's from Hacking's solutions to inverse inference.
16 See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the sufficiency principle from conditionalization.
16 This and other purely statistical claims made in the text can be referred to any basic statistics book, e.g., D. V. Lindley, Introduction to Probability and Statistics from a Bayesian Viewpoint (New York: Cambridge, 1965 ).
representative does not violate the total-evidence requirement (for this problem), if we assume sufficiency.
Nonetheless, we should have doubts about the viability of Kyburg's program for using the RR predicate to solve inverse inference through direct inference because representatioeness is always limited to a few aspects of the total evidence and we have no guarantee that these aspects form a sufficient summary of all the data. Of course, if conditionalization were valid epistemologically, then sufficiency would be, too, and our doubts would be assuaged. But this answer is of no consequence for Kyburg, since he is adamant in his denial of conditionalization (as Levi's analysis clearly shows). What we discover, from the example sketched below, is that sufficiency fails in epistemological theory, with the upshot that inverse inference fails because the randomness conditions do not pick out the suficient aspects of the evidence for characterizing representativeness.
Imagine a problenl where we are to determine the volume V of a hollow cube about which we are currently "ignorant." In epistemological terms, given our present knowledge, only trivial [E, 1 -E] probability intervals attach to hypotheses about V. For instance, E p~( 6
We have a t our disposal a simple experimental procedure for collecting evidence. A liquid of known density, say 1 unit weight/unit volume, can be poured into the cube to fill it exactly, and then we can weigh the quantity of liquid on a scale. We assume considerable knowledge about this scale ; namely, that it is unbiased with an error component that is closely approximated by a normal distribution with known variance u2. T h a t is, on separate (independent) weighings of an object with true weight W, observed weights w,are distributed in accord with the familiar normal curve with mean (center) a t JY and variance (spread) u2. A single measurement w provides a datum for inverse inference about FV. I n epistemological theory a solution to this inference problem exists by reduction to a direct inference about the rational representativeness of the observed weight. Call an observation w rationally representative a t the qth level just in case w does not differ from W by more than q standard deviations (=qa), i.e., so long as 1 W -w 1 < qr. From several interesting properties of the normal distribution (see Appendix 2), ~x-e know the exact frequency of RR samples, a t any level. The randomness rules convert this information into a claim that, before measurement, the observed I suppress the units, for simplicity. In all cases the magnitude of the measurement is a11 that matters.
weight will be a random member of the set of weighings with respect to representativeness (and known frequency). As in the examples discussed above, after w is observed (since the new evidence is not demonstrably relevant) the randomness claim remains valid, and direct inference about the representativeness of the sample results in a solution to the inverse-inference problem. Moreover, since W = V (the liquid has unit weight/volume), the inverse inference about W is equivalent to inverse inference about V.
Instead of a single weighing of the liquid, we may take (statistically independent) repeated measurements, leading to the data { w I , Wa, . .., w,}, n large and odd. For such a data set there are alternative summaries, e.g., a condensation of information to the sample average a = x i wi + n, or to the sample median w, [=that reading for which (n -1) + 2 observations are smaller, and the same number larger, than it]. With respect to each of these summaries we can define a rationally representative property. But the frequency of representative samples with respect to these aspects of the data conflict. The sample cannot be ra?zdorn with respect to both kinds of representativeness. (See Appendix 2.) I t is not uncommon, in direct inference, for there to be a surfeit of frequency information. The frequency of Fs among Rs can differ from the frequency of Fs among R*s. If it is known that entity a is both an R and an R*, then we must look to the randomness regulations for a proper reference class (and frequency bounds). If we are suitably ignorant of the frequency of Fs among the (narrower) class of R-and-R*s, then each candidate for randomness may be defeated by the rival (because of the incompatible frequencies), with the upshot that only a trivial [E, 1 -E ] epistemological probability is valid for the hypothesis that a is F. This is the circumstance we find ourselves in with the n-fold sample of weighings. Having seen a and w,, we are forced to reject each claim that the sample is representative (with respect to the corresponding aspect) because information about the other aspect of the sample defeats the contention of randomness. Thus, there is no epistemological solution to the inverse-inference problem in this case, since no direct inference about representativeness is available.
Only trivial [ E , 1 -E] probability intervals attach to hypotheses about V after the data are observed. But these probability values were valid before any experimentation. So the new evidence is irrelevant to the inverse inference, since there is no change in probabilities.
What is unsatisfactory about this result is that, in this problem (and not w,) is sufficient for the data, with respect to W. That is,
all the relevant features of the e~~i d e n c e (about V) are sulllmarized in a, if suficiency is accepted. Then, assuming sufficiency, inference about V should not be defeated by learning w,,,if is already known. Just as, for the binomial problem, information about the first flip does not defeat the randomness claim about the sample's representativeness, so too information about the median value of the sample should not defeat the randomness claim about the represe~itativeness of the sample with respect to its average. But episternological probability theory does not recognize this fact and sufficiency is violated. [See Appendix 2 for details.]
In addition to the losses to inverse inference that follow from the failure of sufficiency, epistemological probability suffers additional defects because of the very general rejection of conditionaiization. To the best of my knowledge no other violation of the conditionalization principle is the result of a failure of some inductive principle that is entailed by conditionalization. Instead, I can categorize the losses only by listing the sorts of problems that are left unsolved. In each case, epistemological theory is peculiar because precise probabilities are licensed which can serve as initial probabilities in Bayes' theorem, yet conditionalization is not satisfied.ls
Setting aside the dificulties with sufficiency, the first of three kinds of problems that go unanswered in Kyburg's theory is exemplified by the historically important Behrens-Fisher problem. I<yburgJs objection to conditionaiization in this problem repeats Neyman's grounds for rejecting Fisher's s o l~i t i o n .~~ T o put matters as simply and generally as I can, the inverse problem about unknown rp is intractable because the attempted reduction to direct inference is blocked by ignorance of some other nuisance factor r. However, inverse inference about j-is possible (by reduction to direct inference). In summation, we have a precise epistemological probability defined for hypotheses Hi-, given data d : denoted QK(H{,/~). Also, precise episternological probability exists for hypotheses >I+, 18 I use this opportunity to correct an error I made in my review of Kyburg's recent book [see this JOURNAL, LXXIV, 1 (January 1977), 47-62]. On page 60 of my review I mistakenly charged Kyburg's theory with a violation of order inverialtce (see sec. 11 below). In fact his system will satisfy order invariance by resorting t o broad probability intervals when all the evidence is known. Also, I take this opportunity t o explain that Kyburg's "co~npromise" between bayesianl nonbayesian methods agrees with the former only R hen the prior epistemological probability is directly supported by known frequencies, and not when the episternological probability is obtained by using randomness conditions to suppress evidence (as irrelevant) just because it cannot be shown to be relevant.
USee Even though each of the epistemological probabilities needed to solve the right-hand side of this equation is precisely defined, conditionalization does not hold, and this equation is epistemologically invalid.21 Thus, Kyburg's system does not generally permit the statistically important technique of "integrating out" nuisance parameters, even when there is a well-defined probability for the nuisance factor.
The second of the three varieties of inverse inference which suffer under epistemological theory can be described under the heading, "combining data of two kinds." Here, data from one kind of experiment support inverse inference about some unknown 6 ; that is, epistemologically, a precise inverse solution exists:
A second experimental report, d', is also available, but d and d' represent different kinds of information which cannot be combined into a single report for one inverse inference about 6. Moreover, the assumption that d and d' are statistically independent yields the equality:
If conditionalization were epistemologically valid, these precise epistemological probabilities would be sufficient to determine pre- That is, assuming conditionalization :
Once again conditionalization fails, and the only solutions to inverse questions (once all the evidence is known) are trivial [E, 
The last of the triad of statistical problems that are left unsolved can be described as a composite of the other two. Here we are given one experimental report, say d, and, in the absence of knowledge of +, we must hypothesize about the other experiment d'.
That is, to use Carnap's account, we are faced with a problem of "singular predictive inference" with data of two kinds. Assuming conditionalization :
Once again, each of the credal probabilities in the right-hand side of this equality is epistemologically well defined and given a precise value. But the equation is invalid in Icyburg's theory and the inverse problem is left with only trivial [E, 
Let us tally up the scorecard on epistemological probability. Icyburg claims that conditionalization is not a sound inductive principle, and defends this view by developing a theory that does not obey the suspect axiom. I contend that Icyburg's defense is inadequate because his theory survives without conditionalization only by failing to resolve basic problems of inverse inference. The catalogue of unsolved problems has the peculiarities that: (i) sufficiency (hence, conditionalization) is invalid; and (ii) each of three other kinds of inference is invalid: inverse inference with nuisance factors, inverse inference with data of different kinds, and singular predictive inference with data of different kinds. What is common to these diverse failures is that, were conditionalization valid, they would not exist.
I conclude that Icyburg has not given us a satisfactory frequentist position because the violations of conditionalization (and sufficiency) are anything but banal.
I1
Kyburg's position represents an extreme frequentism, due to the extensive rejection of conditionalization. We find a more moderate In contrast with Icyburg's theory, Hacking considers a reduction of inverse to direct inference which is limited to problems admitting a precise (point-valued) probability solution. The trick in his approach is to identify a privileged (hypothetical) random variable, called the pivotal variable, which is the object of a simple direct inference before the data are observed, and then by appeal to a special irrelevance principle to retain this direct inference after learning the experimental outcomes, thereby inducing a solution to the inverse-inference problem.
We may rehearse Hacking's argument with the example of the hollow cube. Remember that we are investigating the volume V of a hollow cube. Our experiment consists in filling the cube with a liquid of known density, one unit weight/unit volume, and then weighing the volume of liquid on a scale whose readings w are normally distributed with mean W (the weight of the liquid) and known variance a2. The random quantity ( W -w) is a pivotal variable whose distribution is known precisely, to wit: a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance u2. Thus, before the liquid is weighed (w unobserved) there is a simple direct inference to hypotheses about the next value of the pivotal variable, the value it will have after w is fixed. For example, there is a credal probability of about .67 that -a 5 (W -w) 5 u. After the measurement we know the magnitude w (the observed weight), and this direct inference about the pivotal variable is no longer valid unless the extra information is irrelevant to hypotheses about (W -w).
Hacking presents a novel "principle of irrelevance" which provides a formal criterion for assessing irrelevance claims regarding pivotal variables (149/50 irrelevance unless relevance is demonstrated, the effect of Hacking's irrelevance principle is to deny irrelevance unless it is demonstrated.
In the example above, the additional information w passes the test for irrelevance and the direct inference survives intact. Suppose we observe ru = 15, then the direct inference about the pivotal variable becomes a credal probability of about .67 that -u 2 (W -15) 5 u , or equivalently, that 15 -u < W 5 15 + a. This last statement is a solution to inverse inference about W. Hence, by appeal to an irrelevance principle, inverse inference about the volume of the cube is reduced to direct inference about the pivotal variable.
During the past half-century, since Fisher first introduced fiducial inference through pivotal variables, the statistical literature has been replete with paradoxes showing fiducial probability to be incoherent. A common theme in these cou~lterexamples is the construction of alternative pivotal variables from the same data and parameter (s) for inverse inference, such that the fiducial probability obtained through one pivotal variable is inconsistent with that obtained through a different pivotal variable. For instance, in the example discussed on page 717 (repeated weighings of the liquid), both random quantities ( W -ZD) and (W -w,,,) are pivotal variables, yet the solutions to inverse inference about IV that follow from these are inconsistent. (Remember that there is a coriflict between the frequencies for rational represe~ltativeness of the two sample aspects, page 718.) I t is a tribute to I-Iacking's reconstruction that his principle of irrelevance solves many of these "paradoxes" by eli~ninating all but one family of pivotals for any given problen~, and that family yields a common, coherent solution to the inverse-inference problem. Moreover, Hacking claims, the solution obeys confirmational conditionalizatioil as well (154/5). For example, only the pivotal using the szbficient statistic is legitimated by the irrelevance principle, which is what we would expect since sz~#ciency is a consequence of conditio~~alization. Finally, if Hacking is correct about the validity of conditionalization in his theory, then each of the three varieties of statistical problems considered unsolvable in Kyburg's episternological-probability theory is given a precise, coherent answer. In the discussion that follows, I will show tliat Hacking's program is unsatisfactory because an important inductive principle, ovder i n v a~i a n c e (a consequence of conditionalization), fails. Hence, Hacking's reconstructed fiducial argument violates conditionalization. Lastly, I will argue that no correction exists for this deficiency short of reverting to Kyburg's account where only trivial [E, 1 -E ] probabilities are valid.
The inductive principle I choose to investigate next postulates that no effect can result from the order of acceptance of evidence. Subject to conditionalization, the degree of belief in a hypothesis h, upon learning the compound evidence dl & 7.2, does not depend either upon the sequence in which the data are accepted or upon whether the data are accepted in one fell swoop. Hence,
where Kij is the corpus of knowledge that results from corpus K by first accepting datum di and then enlarging this new body of knowledge by accepting datum di; and where Kidj is the corpus of knowledge that follows from accepting the conjunction di 6.di into K. [See Appendix 3 for the derivation of order invariance from conditionalization.]
What is the significance of this rule for problems of statistical inference? Suppose we flip the newly bent coin nl times and, on the basis of this evidence, assess alternative hypotheses about the magnitude of the bias. Next, if the experiment is continued so that another n2 flips are made, shall the evaluation of the competing hypotheses be changed by the order in which we consider the two sets of outcomes? Moreover, shall our evaluations change once again when we lump together the two sets of trials into one sequence of nl + nz flips? Order invariance secures the identity of solutions to the inverse-inference problem, regardless of how we choose to accept the total evidence a~ailable.~5
I t is interesting to note that traditional significance testing fails order invariance. For example, the commonplace practice of significance testing for a multinomial distribution (of which the text's binomial distribution is a special case) by the use of a x2 test obeys the right-hand, but fails the left-hand equality of order invariance.
For a simple case in point, the x2 test of the null hypothesis that the coin is "fair," based on ni flips of which hi land heads up, determines x2 (with one degree of freedom) by :
For the composite sequence of nl + n2 flips, ni -nl + nz and hi -hl + hl. However, the recommended policy for combining significance tests from independent trials is to use the rule that the sum of (independent) x2has a x2 distribution with the sum of the degrees of freedom of the independent tests. [See, for instance, Fisher, Statistical Methods for Research Workers (New York: Hafner, 13th ed., 1973) .] If, for instance, the two runs (nl and n2) are of equal length, with 40% heads in the first string and 60% heads in the second, then xz -0 for the combined nl + n2 sequence (with one degree of freedom) ; yet each x9 (hence, also the sum which is xzwith two degrees of freedom) is positive.
An alternative analysis for this failure of order invariance is that the rule for combining independent significance tests relies only on the x2 values of the separate tests. I t is easy enough to show that, within a binomial model, the x2 value of a test is not sufficient for the original data used in the test.
Reconsider, for the final time, the problem of the hollow cube. For simplicity, we assume only a single weighing of the liquid, with the observation WL. Imagine, also, that we have a t our disposal a different experiment in which we cut a rigid rod of known density, say one unit weight/unit length, to the length of an edge of the cube. As with the liquid, we may weigh the segment of rod on our scale and observe the weight WE. Now we have an inverse-inference problem about V which involves data of two lcinds (see the discussion of the second variety of inverse inference, page 720 is the true weight of the rod), if W E is measured. Most importantly, each pivotal satisfies the special irrelevance principle, with respect to its counterpart datum. Let us rehearse the different solutions to the inverse-inference problem which follow by conditionalization and by Hacking's fiducia.1 inference. First, observe WL and solve the fiducial inference about V using the pivotal variable (WL-WL). The result is a fiducial probability for values of V, which is precisely described as a normal probability distribution with mean WL and variance u2. The second datum, W R , can be combined with this credal probability by conditionalization (as described on page 721). An alternative solution begins with the fiducial inference about V using the other pivotal variable (WR-WE) and observation WE. The result is a fiducial probability for values of $Txvhich is precisely described as a normal probability distribution with mean ZUR and variance u2. Again, the other datum, z l~, can be combined with this credal probability by conditionalization. Unfortunately, the results are not the same for the two procedures! We can trace the failure of order invariance (and thus of conditionalization too) by examining the bayesian models that support the fiducial inferences. With pivotal variables, like these, which have normal distributions, the bayesian argument that duplicates the fiducial inference is one whose prior probability for the parameter appearing in the pivotal is a utz$onn prior probability. Thus, the fiducial inference about WL [using pivotal (WL -wL)] can be modeled by a bayesian argument where the initial credal probability for values of WL is a flat, uniform distributio~~. Similarly, the fiducial inference about WE [using pivotal Hacking is fully aware that his fiducial argument has bayesian models that require uniform "ignorance" probabilities. He finds this result acceptable and argues that it provides a satisfactory formulation of Insufficient Reason, satisfactory because (allegedly) the theory is consistent." He is not alone among those who would try to find a viable construal of Laplace's intuitively pleasing dictum,29 However, the failure of order invariance is tied to the consistency of Insufficient Reason. A uniform distribution for values of the weight of the liquid, WL, is equivalent to a uniform distribution for values of the volume V of the cube. A uniform distribution for values of the weight of the rod, WE, is equivalent to a uniform distribution for values of the length of an edge of the cube, which is The violation of order invariance (hence of conditionalization) within Hacking's exceptionally lucid reconstruction points to the basic flaw that pervades the frequentist strategy for reducing inverse to direct inference. If conditionalization is to be valid once credal probabilities are well defined (and how else is the theory to provide answers to the varieties of problems discussed in the previous section?), then a precise solution to inverse inference will be modeled by some precise "ignorance" probability. But just which prior probability is chosen to model ignorance will depend upon the kind of evidence to be acquired. No one "ignorance" probability will serve to model the reduction of inverse to direct inference for all the kinds of data that might be accepted. Thus the parallel between the choice of a privileged parameterization for applying Insufficient Reason and the choice of a privileged random variable for direct inference is both clear and instructive. Just as frequentists are prepared to reject the bayesian solution to inverse inference because the assumption of a precise prior probability is found to be untenable, so too they should not expect a reduction of inverse to direct inference because the assumption of a special variable to support the direct inference is incompatible with even a weakened commitment to conditionalization. 
Appendix 2
I n this appendix we examine, in some detail, the epistemological-probability solution t o the problem discussed in section I of the paper. Following conventional notation, let N(p, u2) stand for the normal distribution with mean p and variance u2. I n the example considered, the sequence (wl, . . ., w,) form a data set of n (n moderately large and odd) mutually independent readings from a N(V, 1) distribution. We investigate two statistics (reductions) of the data: t o (sample average) and m (sample median).
T h e relevant distributions for the sample statistics are:
(i) a has a N(V, l/n) distribution.
(ii) m has, approximately, a N(V, n/2n) distribution.
is sufficient; so the conditional distribution of m, given a,is approximately N ( a , .57/n).
From the distribution of a , it follows t h a t the percentage of n-fold samples with a within d j 3 units of V, i.e., the percentage of n-fold samples satisfying RRdfi(a), is just the percentage of a normal distribution within d j standard deviations of the mean. T h a t is, approximately 95% of all n-fold samples satisfy RR2/dZ(a). Similarly, R R applies to sample medians; so t h a t the percentage of n-fold samples with a median within ( d~/ 2 ) (.\I3>) units of Ti , i.e., the percentage of n-fold samples satisfying RR4-(m), is just the percentage of a normal distribution within d j standard deviations of the mean. T h a t is, approximately 95y0 of all n-fold samples satisfy RR (,qj,(,/d;;,(m) .
T h e distributions t h a t would follow for V, if both R R ( a ) and RR(m) support appropriate randomness claims, are precise and mutually inconsistent. Hence, unless trivial epistemological probability statements about V are t o result fro111 the d a t a ( a , m), one of the randomness claims [randomness of either RR(m) or R R ( 8 ) I must be defeated. Moreover, if the sufficiency principle is t o hold, then only the randomness claim regarding R R ( 8 ) is valid.
Thus, t o show t h a t sufficiency fails in epistemological probability theory i t is enough t o demonstrate t h a t either t h a t (a) knowledge of a does not defeat the purported randomness claim: the n-fold sample is a random member of all n-fold samples with respect t o RR(m)-relying on frequencies generated by (ii) (above) ; or t h a t (b) knowledge of m defeats the purported randomness claim: the 72-fold sample is a random member of all n-fold samples with respect t o RR(@)-relying on frequencies generated by (i) (above).
Kyburg's regulations for determining valid randomness claims are extremely complicated. There are several prevention and counterprevention clauses t o each basic strategy for showing (or defeating) a randomness claim. A t the time of this writing (and follo~ving much correspondence with Kyburg on the point) it appcars t h a t (b) is true. FIowever, t o clinch the matter, let me show how (a) holds as well.
Suppose the evidence consists of the reported m value only. 'Then, since 8 is unknown, there is no challenge t o the randomness claim of (a) (above). If a becomes known, does it defeat this randomness claim? Because 8 (and not a)is sufficient for I.', by the sufficiency principle zlr is relevant t o inference about V if only m is known. But Icyburg's randomness rules d o not agree with this result of sufficiency.
T h e conditional distribution of m, for known a, is found in (iii) (above).
If we consider the reference set of all n-fold samples with a fixed sample mean (fixed a t 8 ) then the distribution of m values will be N ( 8 , .57/n), approximately. T h a t is, in this conditional reference set the m values tend to be distributed about 8 , with a distribution independent of V (since 0 is sufficient for V). The randomness regulations for testing the effect of this conditional distribution on the claims in (a) are found in Kyburg's randomness principles I and I1 (p. 227 of his book), which can be summarized as: narrower reference sets get priority over competing frequency distributions, unless the narrower set also carries a broader (containing) interval of frequencies than the intervals associated with the wider reference set.
When @ is close to V , the conditional reference set has frequencies for RR(m) which exceed the corresponding frequencies for RR(m) unconditionally. When 20 is far from V , the conditional reference set has frequencies for RR(m) which fall far below the corresponding frequencies for RR(m) unconditionally. Thus, in the narrower reference set, obtained by fixing the sample average, the distribution for RR(m) ranges from frequencies below, t o frequencies above the frequencies in the unconditioned reference set of all n-fold samples. Hence, by randomness conditions I and 11, 8 does not prevent the randomness clainl in (1)-contrary to the dictates of sufficiency.
